EXCEPTION



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JIM IRVIN

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CARL J. KUNASEK

COMMISSIONER

**COMMISSIONER** 

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPETITION IN

THE PROVISION OF ELECTRIC SERVICES THROUGHOUT THE STATE OF ARIZONA.

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27 28 BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

AZ CORP COMMISSION

3 17 PM '99 **COMMISIONER-CHAIRMAN** 

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CALPINE'S EXCEPTIONS TO **FEBRUARY 5, 1999** RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HEARING OFFICER

Calpine Power Services ("Calpine") files these Exceptions to the February 5, 1999 Recommended Orders of the Hearing Officer.

#### STRANDED COST PROPOSED ORDER

The "financial integrity" method does not explain adequately what is meant by "sufficient revenues to at least meet minimum financial ratios." These parameters should be established in advance. In it June 22, 1998 Decision No. 60977, the Commission interpreted this "financial integrity" as "avoiding default under current existing financial instruments during a transition period, or the Commission to otherwise provide an allocation of stranded costs responsibilities and risks between ratepayers and shareholders." Decision No. 60977 at 11. The Commission also required the Affected Utility file minimum financial ratios to maintain financial viability for 10 years. Id. at 12. This criterion of minium financial ratios "to avoid default" should be added to the Stranded Cost Order.

#### **ELECTRIC COMPETITION RULEMAKING ORDER**

# "Stranded Cost" Definition Should Be Retained

Arizona Public Service Company ("APS") has requested that the reference to "value" be deleted in the present Rule 1601(39) and substitute the term "net original cost." APS claims that this change merely allows for the possibility that post-1996 costs might be included in stranded cost. This is misleading and there is no definition of what is meant by "net original cost." Is depreciation deducted from the original cost? Is the past recovery of regulatory assets deducted

from the original cost?

APS's concern over post-1996 costs is also raised in its other recommendation that the following language be included: "Stranded Cost includes [o]ther transition and restructuring costs as approved by the Commission." APS suggests this subsection be added so as to be consistent with Decision No. 60977, but it failed to explain the purpose behind the Commissions' comment was for recovery of transition and restructuring costs associated with divestiture and the Commission wanted a fixed cutoff date. The Rules already provide that "reasonable costs necessarily incurred by an Affected Utility to effectuate divestiture of its generation assets" and "reasonable employee severance and retaining costs necessitated by electric competition" may be recovered by the Affected Utility under Rule 1601(39)(b) & (c). Consequently, no change to the definition of Stranded Costs is necessary.

## ESP Registration Process Should Be Implemented with a Shorter Time-Frame

Electric Service Providers ("ESP") should be entitled to "register" with the Arizona Corporation Commission and then be subject to the Commission Rules and jurisdiction. Instead, these Proposed Rules attempt to place a "regulated blanket" over every aspect of the ESP's business, which go beyond consumer protection and protecting the public interest. Instead of moving towards open competition, these Proposed Rules will expand the bureaucracy of the Commission. A simplified process, requiring the completion of an application, is all that is required. No hearing should be required unless requested by an affected party. The ESP would be required to comply with the Electric Competition Rules and consumer protections.

after 'adoption of this Article': 'or after the adoption of this Article if approved by the Commission.'

In addition, as stated above, the Rule should be clarified that additional costs may also be included in stranded costs, such as costs related to divestiture or to retaining of workers whose jobs are lost

because of competition, and costs related to or resulting from divestiture." Decision 60977 at 13.

<sup>1</sup> "We believe there does need to be a reasonable cutoff period for stranded costs and the

approval date of the Electric Competition Rules is a reasonable cutoff. While the Affected Utilities may have additional costs related to transactions in implementing electric competition, those costs, if reasonable, can be factored into the market price. For clarification, the following should be added

The overall time-frame for granting ESPs their Certificates of Convenience and Necessity should not exceed 180 days, with the administrative completeness review by Staff within 45 days and substantive review within 90 days. It is recommended that these dates be changed in Proposed Rule 1603.J. With the safeguards already in place in these Rules, expediting the process will lower the cost of doing business which will create low-cost services for the consumer.

### Competitive Bid Process Should be Required for Standard Offer Services

Rule 1606.B has been changed. It deletes the competitive bid process and merely states that purchases be made "through the open market." Calpine urges that the previous provision be retained, which reads: "After January 1, 2001, power purchased by a Utility Distribution Company to serve Standard Offer customers, except purchases made through spot markets, shall be acquired through competitive bid."

A critical distinction occurs between a competitive bid process and the open market. After January 1, 2001, the generation assets of the Affected Utility must be transferred to a competitive affiliate of the Affected Utility's Utility Distribution Company or to a non-affiliate entity. The Utility Distribution Company could then purchase all of its generation from its competitive affiliate if no competitive bid process is required. By deleting the bid requirement, Rule 1606.B is meaningless since all generation will be purchased on the open market after January 1, 2001, even between a Utility Distribution Company and its generation affiliate.

Rule 1601.B should require bidding as the sole means of securing wholesale power supplies by the Utility Distribution Company. This condition brings economic efficiency, less risk in developing new capacity, and more public approval. The bidding program is a means for the Utility Distribution Company to entertain proposals from outside power producers, including the competitive affiliate of the Utility Distribution Company. The bidding program allows non-utilities — customers that generate, independent power producers, co-generators, and so forth — to sell power to the Utility Distribution Company. Economic theory dictates that a competitive bid program allows the Utility Distribution Company to select the best electricity provider at the best

price. Consequently, customers of the Standard Offer Service would receive the greatest savings and economic gain.

A 1988 report from the National Regulatory Research Institute, the research arm of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, recommended bidding programs in purchasing electricity.

Under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 ("EPAct"), non-utility generators were granted the right to engage in "wholesale wheeling," whereby they could sell power to any utility using transmission lines, not just the local utility that was situated closest to them. In April 1996, to implement and extend further the pro-competitive benefits of EPAct, FERC issued Order No. 888 and No. 889; these orders provided more specific guidelines on how transmission lines are to be opened up to competitors on a non-discriminatory basis. These Orders require vertically integrated monopolistic utilities to offer access at a single-tariff comparable to what they would charge themselves for similar services. EPAct and the latest FERC orders opened up the electric marketplace to all power providers under the open access philosophy of deregulation and competitive purchases. Calpine desires the ability to sell its power to Utility Distribution Companies for resale to their customers. The bid process will allow all generators to compete in the Standard Offer Service market so that all Arizona customers will benefit from electric deregulation.

Without mandatory divestiture of generation assets, the bid process is of even greater importance in creating a competitive environment. Although structural unbundling might be attempted with the formation of a competitive affiliate of an Utility Distribution Company, it will still result in a situation whereby "its kind of like borrowing from Mark to pay Dick or vice versa," to use a phrase from William Meek of the Arizona Investors Association.<sup>2</sup> In other words, the incentive of the parent company is to have its Utility Distribution Company purchase on "the open market" power from its own competitive generation affiliate, even though it may

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Direct Testimony of Walter W. Meek, *In the Matter of Arizona Public Service Company's Rate Reduction Agreement*, ACC Docket No. U-1345-95-491 (4/96) at 6.

not be the lowest price. Requiring a competitive bid for Standard Offer Service would prevent this from occurring.

Filing of ESP

Filing of ESP Maximum Rates Is All That Should Be Required

ESPs are required to provide "adequate supporting documentation for their proposed rates" and all rates approved by another jurisdiction, such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, in Proposed Rule 1606.I. In a monopolistic environment, the Commission appropriately sets tariffs based upon cost of service. In a competitive environment, prices are negotiated based upon supply and demand and market forces. Although the Commission may have an interest in knowing what the maximum rate might be, it would be difficult for any ESP to set a rate in advance of the bilateral or multilateral negotiation with customers. If ESPs are required to disclose the cost basis of services prior to negotiation, it would discourage, if not preclude, the investment of offering competitive services. This is proprietary information, which is far different from a monopolistic situation where the utility has captive customers. Therefore, it is urged that Rule 1606.I be deleted. Under Proposed Rule 1612.B, ESPs are required to file their tariffs describing their services and maximum rates. That is all that is needed.

Estimates of Unmitigated Stranded Cost Should be Submitted by March 19, 1999

Rule 1607.C provides that each Affected Utility must file estimates of unmitigated Stranded Costs. In the subsequent section, the Affected Utility must file on or before March 19, 1999 its distribution charges or other means of recovering unmitigated Stranded Costs. In order to make these two subsections consistent, the first sentence in Rule 1607.C should read: "The Affected Utility shall file estimates of unmitigated Stranded Costs on or before March 19, 1999." In order to assess the reasonableness of the distribution charges or other means of recovering unmitigated Stranded Costs, both the estimates and the means of recovery should be filed on or before March 19, 1999.

# Affiliate Transaction Review of Non- "Utility Distribution Companies" Are Unnecessary, Burdensome, and Anti-Competitive

Rule 1617 includes a new provision. Electric service providers that might have an affiliate Utility Distribution Company in another jurisdiction would be subject to the affiliate rules in this Proposed Order. Purpose of the Affiliate Rule is to preclude cross-subsidization between an Arizona Utility Distribution Company ("UDC") and its affiliate and collusion between an Arizona-regulated UDC activities and the UDC's parent or affiliate.

The Proposed Order intends to expand the definition of a Utility Distribution Company for the purpose of extra jurisdictional review of affiliate relationships <u>outside</u> of Arizona. No harm could occur to Arizona customers if an out-of-state regulated utility or its affiliate desired to subsidize lower cost services in Arizona. If the out-of-state provider has higher costs as a result of subsidizing its regulated activities, Arizona consumers would not purchase those services if they are priced higher than other competitive services available to those consumers. This logic is consistent with how cross-subsidies are addressed in Rule 1617.A.8: no noncompetitive service rate may subsidize a Utility Distribution Company's competitive electric affiliate, and not vice versa. Competitive affiliates of an Arizona Utility Distribution Company may subsidize the UDC so long as those services are not provided below marginal costs.

Furthermore, the out-of-state activity of any ESP affiliate is already subject to regulatory review in its home state. The only objective of this requirement is to increase the cost of entering the Arizona competitive market. This proposed change in the Rules is clearly anti-competitive.

#### **Technical Corrections**

"Electric Service Provider" definition in Rule 1601(14) should include the word "Services" after Competitive.

"Systems Benefits," as set forth in the new definition Rule 1601(36), includes "market transformation" even though the commentary states that this reference will be deleted, on page 10 of the Concise Explanatory Statement. The words "market transformation" should be deleted.

Rule 1608 pertains to systems benefits charges. In keeping with the practice of not

1	repeating the definition in the body of the Rules, the last sentence in Subsection 1008. A should
2	read: "The amount collected annually through the System Benefits charge shall be sufficient to
3	fund the Affected Utilities' or Utility Distribution Companies' Commission-approved System
4	Benefits low income, consumer education, demand side management, environmental,
5	renewables, long-term public benefit research and development, nuclear fuel disposal and nuclear
6	power plant decommissioning programs and other programs that may be approved by the
7	Commission from time to time.
8	The last sentence in Rule 1616.C should include the word "Cooperative" instead of
9	"Cooperatives."
0	Concluding Remarks
1	Calpine urges that the competitive bid process be retained. Furthermore, it urges that the
2	other Exceptions as described herein be adopted.
3	RESPECTFULLY submitted this 17 <sup>th</sup> day of February, 1999.
4	DOLICI AS C. MELSON, D.C.
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